sponsibility to use the best available evidence to design safe passenger aircraft, and that I believe that physicians have a moral responsibility to base their interactions with me on the best available credible evidence. I then explain that I have come to believe that healthcare design professionals have a comparable moral obligation to base their work on the careful interpretation of the best evidence from credible research findings and rigorous analysis from practice. I see this as a compelling ethical responsibility for the designers of settings in which patients and staff are at risk. The next slide in my presentation suggests that healthcare leadership has an equal moral and ethical responsibility to guarantee that capital projects take full advantage of relevant evidence. A s a professor of architecture known for promoting evidence-based design (Hamilton & Watkins, 2010; Stichler & Hamilton, 2008) , especially in the healthcare field (Hamilton & Shepley, 2010) , I am asked on a fairly regular basis to lecture on that topic. At various times at Texas A&M University, Clemson, Arizona State, Ohio State, the University of Tennessee, and for an assortment of other national or international audiences, I have publicly contended that once someone has been exposed to the important realization that evidence can improve design decisions that affect the delivery of lifesaving healthcare, a moral obligation follows.
At some point in my presentation, I suggest that aeronautical engineers clearly have a moral re- It usually includes text something like this simple chain of logic:
• If credible evidence indicates that design can improve clinical outcomes and patient safety, • and if healthcare executives are responsible for construction projects and budgets, • then healthcare executives have a responsibility to select and encourage qualified architects and teams of design professionals to make use of such evidence. Of course, the answer to these ifs is that we do have credible evidence. Thus, the executive team must share the responsibility for creating safe and effective environments for the sacred work of healing. Organizational leaders must partner with a team of design professionals to realize each project using the best information available.
The executive team must share the responsibility for creating safe and effective environments for the sacred work of healing.
Much of this issue of HERD addresses topics relevant to the leadership and governance of healthcare organizations in their role as stewards of the environments they serve, in which vitally important care is delivered. Zimring, Augenbroe, Malone, and Sadler (2008) have described the crucial role of the CEO in an evidence-based process. Without the active and engaged support of leadership, opportunities to obtain superior outcomes can be missed. In this context, I add my charge to everyone in a healthcare administration or governance role to accept the ethical responsibility, on behalf of their patients, their community, and the organization they represent, to support key design decisions based on the best available relevant, credible evidence. This is a Pandora's box situation. Once the box is opened and the truth emerges, it cannot be denied or forced back in. In this case, the truth is that there is a remarkable and growing body of published, rigorous, scientific research findings involving the designed and constructed environment or environmental features and their relationship to clinical outcomes and physiological or psychological measures (Ulrich, Zimring, Quan, Joseph, & Choudhary, 2004; Ulrich et al., 2008) . It is no longer possible to contend that there is no evidence to support the improved design of hospital and healthcare settings.
There are methods to evaluate the quality of evidence, including new and emerging studies (Pati, 2011; Stichler, 2009 Stichler, , 2010 . There is a framework for considering evidence related to safety and clinical outcomes (Ulrich, Berry, Quan, & Parish, 2010) . At the same time, observers should note that the built environment does not lend itself to randomized clinical trials and parallel projects to create control groups, causing some to erroneously discount useful findings derived from rigorous research in the environmental domain (Hamilton, 2011) . Evidence that could be used to support design decisions comes in many forms and extends well beyond studies related to safety and clinical outcomes (Hamilton, 2008) , so the selection of an evidence-based design process can mean that additional nonclinical decisions could also be improved.
The issues surrounding safety and clinical outcomes demand our serious attention. The stakes are high, and adverse outcomes are unacceptable. For this reason, research findings that might influence design decisions with the potential to affect safety or clinical outcomes should be used to enhance the quality of those decisions (Gurses & Pronovost, 2011) . There is a growing body of evidence relating to clinical outcomes and safety (Ulrich et al., 2004; Ulrich et al., 2008) which, four years ago, comprised more than 1,200 citations in the literature addressing the impact of the designed environment on these outcomes. Even more studies are available today as new research studies are published.
The case for the use of evidence-based decision making on capital projects is increasingly powerful, both financially and economically.
The case for the use of evidence-based decision making on capital projects is increasingly powerful, both financially and economically (Berry et al., 2004; Sadler, Dubose, & Zimring, 2008) . Decisions based on evidence have been shown in many cases to reduce first cost. In cases where decisions based on rigorous evidence have added to initial cost, they have been shown to produce rapid returns on invest-ment. Financial officers accustomed to data-driven decision making are more comfortable when design decisions can be justified by credible research.
The case for stewardship is strong (Hamilton, 2009) . Executives and the governance group of healthcare organizations are accountable to their communities and sponsors. Increasingly they must be able to show evidence of their careful stewardship of community and sponsor resources. A useful method to ensure that leadership has, in fact, made defensible decisions is to follow a project with the careful measurement of outcomes. One hopes we will not see the day when healthcare executives are routinely sued on the basis of failure to exercise their responsibility to utilize the best evidence in designing, constructing, and operating facilities financed with community resources. I predict that the wise executive will insist that decisions on healthcare projects be justified with relevant, credible evidence.
